1: Herskovits E-4, 5 (1934) 1937 SV3 Haiti SV3
Mirebalais

857 hide-and-seek and enjoy story-telling sessions, when the tales of 'Ti Malice and Bouki are recounted. Still older ones make drums out of jars and "arrange a dance." Little girls play with dolls made for them by the older children, while boys with sticks for horses organize themselves into "armies" with their
852 seniors as officers. When a child's teeth fall out, a minor ceremony is performed. As each tooth is detached, the child throws it on the roof of the mother's house, saying:

[539] *"Rat, rat, rat,*
M'jet' yun bel' 'ti dent ba 'ou,
Ba'm yun vieille dent."

"Rat, rat, rat,
I give you a nice little tooth,
Give me an old tooth."

871 At this same time a beginning of formal education is made, especially if the child lives in the town or near enough to it to
872 allow him to reach one of the schools there. These schools are under both secular and Catholic auspices, and in them the pupil is instructed in the rudiments of European education, learning to read and write and to do simple problems in arith-
873 metic. If he shows proficiency and the means of his family permit, he may go on to a secondary school at Port-au-Prince or some other center: in the main, however, this schooling is all he ever receives, if he is permitted this much.

861 It is not to be supposed that a child is allowed to grow up
593 without learning how to conduct himself in accordance with
602 the traditional code of Haitian behavior, for the punishment that follows departures from this code is always both prompt and extremely painful, beating with sticks being the mode of correction most often employed. The mechanisms of education and control operate the more effectively because they are exercised by a fairly large group of persons, which includes not only the father and mother of the child, but also his grandparents, his uncles and aunts on both sides of the family, and
603 his older brothers, sisters, and cousins. Less restraint is exer-
593 cised before grandparents than other relations, for while there
604

2: Courlander B-5 (1937-1955) 1960 SV3 Haiti SV3 [P-112-L]

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18. Young Haitians in school. After a century and a half of independence, education remains one of Haiti's most severe problems. Only a small percentage of the country's children are in schools.

[P. 338]

4. *Notes on Orthography*

104 The problem of putting the Creole language into writig has confronted
197 Haitian and non-Haitian scholars and writers for sme time. During
89 the past decade the problem has been an acute one for education au-
14 thorities in Haiti. While there developed a consensusthat teaching the
[212] largely illiterate population would have to be done i Creole and not
in French, there remained a controversy about the system of orthography
that should be used. One of the first attempts to teac Haitian children
in their own language was made by Christian Beaulie, a Haitian edu-
cator who worked out a written method based on traditional French
orthography.[1] Subsequently, a simpler system was devised by a clergy-
man, the Reverend H. Ormond McConnell. Although it had numerous
detractors among those who favored French orthography, it was found
to be far more suitable for educational purposes. The American linguist
Robert A. Hall, Jr., carried out a study, the findings of which supported
the McConnell method as "perfectly phonemic and at the same time
wholly practicable in that it uses only characters already available in
print shops and on typewriters."[2]

104 Some Creole texts from Haiti and other West Indian islands, taken
down by researchers and scholars, have been transcribed in the Mc-
Connell orthography, or in a modified one known as the McConnell-
[114] Laubach system. It is my opinion that although the system is admirable
for teaching purposes, and adequate for recording texts for scholarly
needs, it is a disadvantage to a reader who has a French vocabulary at
his command but who is not familiar with the McConnell orthography.
The extent to which this system can disguise a language is easily seen
if it is used, for example, to transcribe Jamaican speech. The effect is
identical on French words or words of French origin. The Haitian
proverb "Run from the rain, fall into the big river" is written by Hall
in the McConnell-Laubach orthography: *Kouri poulapli, tòbé nd-grd*

1 [UNESCO, The Haiti Pilot Project, P. 9. Cf. P. 355, Category 116. -- Analyst]
2 [Ib. 1. Cf. P. 355, Category 116. - Analyst]

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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elite and the yeomanry. For instance, he calls attention to one unanticipated (but inevitable) result of the occupation in this connection: the large number of children whose fathers were United States Marines, and whose mothers were members of the Haitian rural masses. In this way the occupation contributed to the growth of the physically intermediate population of Haiti, especially among rural folk, and thus perhaps to some bridging of the gap between yeomen and elite. Much more important, by its contributions to a broadening of the educational system, the occupation enabled talented black-skinned youths to improve themselves and to acquire new aspirations.

Recent economic and political developments in Haiti, through the period 1941–57, have contributed grounds for modification of the Leyburn interpretation. Though Leyburn predicted that "for the present and near future it is safe to say that there will be no more black non-élite presidents" (p. 101), subsequent developments soon proved him wrong. In January 1946, the government of elite member Elie Lescot fell under military pressure. A junta consisting of Franck Lavaud, Antoine Levelt, and Paul Magloire facilitated the installation of Dumarsais Estimé as president. Estimé was a dark-skinned man from the countryside (the village of Verettes, near St. Marc, in west-central Haiti), who had received a good education, served as a minister in the Vincent cabinet and, as a deputy, married a lighter-skinned woman whose family's élite membership was secure. Estimé might well be considered a self-made member of the elite, but he was not born into it, and his accession to power was the political expression of new possibilities in Haitian life.

The changes Estimé's regime symbolized were rooted in the intellectual resistance to the United States occupation and in the search for a Haitian identity in the face of that occupation. The strangely easy domination that the United States wielded over Haitian society for several decades, and the relatively unexploitative but patronizing administration it provided, ended forever a fantasy that had gripped Haitian intellectuals for more than a century. The world of 1804, when a bloodied but defiant Haiti could bar by force of arms Napoleon's dreams of a New World empire (and assist indirectly thereby in the territorial expansion of a still weak United States) had vanished. The time when a Pétion could aid, protect, and politically influence a sick and tired Simón Bolívar was long gone. The world had changed, while Haiti, the Haitians learned under their North

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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American masters, had nearly stood still. For almost a century, Haiti's elite had taken justifiable pride in their ancestors' triumph over Napoleonic France, even while they remained enthralled by French culture. This strange ambivalence would no longer do. In effect, the United States occupation compelled Haitian scholars to rediscover what it meant to be Haitian.

As the writing of Jean Price-Mars (1928) expressed that identity culturally, so the regime of Dumarsais Estimé began to express it politically. For the first time, Africa, and not simply France, became an important part of the nationalist dialogue. The Creole language began to be studied in its own right, and a program to end illiteracy through education in Creole was launched. Folkloristic studies, emphasizing the African component in Haitian rural life, especially as expressed in religion, came into vogue. Haitians began to explore their own society as a synthesis that was as much African as it was French—and as a synthesis, rather than as a mechanical alignment of two distinct traditions. The term *authentique* was employed to express what was "truly Haitian," and Haiti herself was viewed as a unique and original blending of two pasts. Under Estimé, rural folk of promise—and they were, in the nature of things, predominantly dark-skinned—were given greater opportunities, especially to be educated and to enter government service. Moreover, these developments took place at a time when Haiti's economic situation was relatively good, and Estimé enjoyed a measure of popular support rare in Haiti's entire history.

Furthermore, it was during the Estimé regime that Haitian cultural life reached some sort of climax. In the 1920s young Haitian intellectuals had been deeply shaken by the United States occupation and had begun to formulate their own answers to the questions it raised. Not only did Africa come into view as the wellspring of much that was Haitian but Haiti's status as an occupied though once-sovereign power dramatized the need for a social and political philosophy that fitted with hemispheric and international realities. French intellectual currents figured importantly in Haitian political thinking, both because the intellectuals of the French Antilles of the time were inspired by Haitian history and interested in Haiti, and because those islands and Haiti shared a curious affinity in their "Gallo-African" cultures. Anticolonial and Marxist points of view were espoused by a few Haitians, but these perspectives were complicated by changing

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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regime. That President Duvalier has been able to stay in power in spite of internal dissaffection, sometime hostile United States propaganda, a dire economic situation, personal ill health, and other woes, is a tribute to his political acumen, if not to his principles. None of this means, of course, that such consummate skill will continue to work; Haitian governments have a way of falling suddenly, and the Duvalier regime will probably not prove an exception.

Dr. Duvalier's success indicates that he has made certain correct assessments, not only of Haiti's social and political structure but also of United States policy with regard to Haiti. The occupation was notable for its failure to make any telling alterations in the economic structure or level of development of the country. Many beneficial changes were made, as Leyburn demonstrates, particularly in the areas of health and health services, communications, government administration, education, and transport (though the use of corvee labor on the roads led to serious abuses, and stimulated sanguinary guerilla warfare). But most significantly, the United States institutionalized the army and police forces. The ragged bands of political mercenaries of the past were dissolved; the officer-ridden army was transformed into a small, well-trained, and well-organized force. Eventual firm control by this force of weaponry, communications, and transport ended the era of presidential succession by invasion, turned the army into the major locus of nonelectoral, president-making power, and may have ended forever the possibility of an agrarian revolt against the central authority. Another political effect of the occupation was the importance it imparted to the United States ambassador, whose political opinions thereafter would matter significantly in the transmission of power at the top of the Haitian governmental system. The Duvalier regime has continuously taken full account of the consequences of United States interest; and its leaders have been able to watch the operation of that interest in the political events occurring between the fall of the Lescot government and the present.

In the view of one acute observer, President Duvalier, in order to consolidate his power, had to cope with three other loci of political strength in addition to the army and the United States ambassador. The business community, located for the most part in Port-au-Prince, had strongly supported Déjoie's candidacy during the interregnum; its leaders were mainly members of the elite, and many had strong

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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643 771 795 At the same time, the President has expressed his favorable interest in vodoun and is said to practice it; this statement, however, has overtones of malevolence that are not appropriate. Vodoun is a religion, though it lacks a centralized priestly hierarchy or administrative organization. Outside the elite, Catholicism in Haiti has always been colored by vodoun elements. The Haitian people as a whole invest no effort in distinguishing what is "really Catholic" from what is not, in their religious practices; in this regard Haitian countrymen do not really differ from folk practitioners of Catholicism anywhere. By its misreading of the piety of the Haitian masses, and its unceasing hostility to vodoun—quite different from the church policy in the so-called "Indian countries" of Latin America—the Church had failed to secure its influence over the Haitian people. In contrast, Duvalier's understanding of Haitian religious sociology has proved superior, and is consistent with the *authentique* ideology of the 1940s, though doubtless much more extreme in its implications.

642 871 467 204 661 Finally, the Duvalier regime has invaded such institutions as the National University and the trade unions, and maintains close surveillance over any individuals it regards as politically suspicious. Loyalty oaths are required at the university; a public press no longer exists; the unions, never strong, are now entirely powerless. But it should be clear from this description of the Duvalier regime that repression is not the key to Duvalier power so much as the means for perpetuating that power under Haitian conditions. The key to Duvalier power is to be found instead in the structure of Haitian society, in the social history of the past two decades, and in the policy of the United States, weakened by its inescapable preference for "stability" over "radicalism." In his own way, President Duvalier is as radical as he can be; but he is no Castro. It is now an open secret that Haiti's support for sanctions against Cuba approved at Punta del Este was matched by economic concessions from the United States; that the Marines, knowingly or not, immobilized anti-Duvalier opposition in a period when its supporters could be picked off, driven into exile, or jailed; that the official Duvalier offer of Môle St. Nicholas to the United States as a substitute for Guantánamo, though irrelevant, was warmly reassuring to some North American political thinkers; and that Duvalier, while he employs considerable "blackmail diplomacy" in his dealings with the United States and is now out of favor, is still considered "reliable" in that most important respect.

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The distinction between castes on the basis of occupation is nowhere more clearly seen than in the feminine sphere. The peasant woman, from childhood onward, is an indefatigable laborer, absolutely indispensable to the economic life of the country. She not only performs the usual domestic functions but works in the fields as well. She carries marketable goods, sometimes for miles, to the town for sale. The aristocratic woman, on the other hand, is rarely active in business. Indeed, until very recent years no career was open to her outside the home, nor would custom have allowed her to follow one; even now, teaching and a few clerical positions in government service are her only business opportunities. She directs the household economy but has servants if she can possibly afford them. Her place is definitely in the home.

The second infallible test of membership in the élite caste is education and an ability to speak French. When Haiti was a slave colony belonging to France, the hundreds of thousands of blacks imported from Africa had no common tongue, coming as they did from wide stretches of the continent; the French spoken by their overseers, a development of the Norman dialect,[3] became their one language, known as Créole. Every Haitian, high and low, knows and uses this language, for nursemaids speak it to the upper-class children in their charge, and all servants speak it. The élite consequently learn it at a tender age, and must use it in all their dealings with the lower orders. Among themselves, however, they speak French. The official language of the country is French. To speak correct French is an immediate announcement that one has had the advantage of schooling and has been in contact with the aristocracy. Theoretically, Haitian education is free and democratic; actually, no peasant child could be spared from labor long enough for schooling, or find money for proper clothes to go to school in.

Inevitably the standard of living is a reflection of caste membership. "The élite wear shoes," explained General Butler laconically to the United States Senate investigating committee, when asked what characterized the classes of Haiti. His elliptical remark is true. Peasants, indeed, could not afford to purchase shoes, but more particularly they could not afford to dress up to the standard set by the shoes. When a man of the masses dons the castoff shoes of some aristocrat, the logical assumption by everyone is that this man is pre-

3. See chap. XVIII.

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tiny communities, some of them designating "villages" of only four or five houses. For numbers of peasants hidden away in the valleys or on mountain farms, the only contact with the larger world comes through visits to the nearest market town—which itself may count only a thousand souls. The peasant is thus effectively isolated. The American Financial Adviser to the Government has estimated the average *annual* income of the Haitian at $20 a head.[8] The smallness of the sum limits the material contacts of the peasant with the outside world. Rural schools are few,[9] consequently all but a small percentage of the rising generation is growing up illiterate. Lack of mental stimulus completes the isolation. Bound to the soil by the need of wresting a livelihood from rocky, gullied, and increasingly unproductive land, harassed by ill-health, and governed by a group whose own security would be threatened by improving his lot, it is little wonder that the peasant is unprogressive, or that he struggles along at a bare subsistence level.[10]

Haiti is rural and agricultural, then, with a population density of about 250 per square mile. The people, living without machine industry and with very little foreign trade, must get their living from 10,000 square miles, not of lush tropical soil but of rocky, mountainous country which, after a century and a half of poor farming, has been stripped of most of its forests and much of its topsoil.

A glance at a relief map of the West Indies would show clearly that the islands are the tops of a mountain range, whose lowlands were long since submerged by the Caribbean Sea. Looked at from above, Haiti seems a jumbled mass of mountains running in all directions.[11] Down their slopes flow many small streams which after

8. Dr. W. W. Cumberland, cited by Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLII (1927), 258.

9. The average monthly salary of $13 (until recently only $6) for rural schoolteachers would not draw many wide-awake young men, even if schoolhouses existed for classes. The salary, indeed, is so small that only inferior persons are attracted, often men who know little more than their pupils. See chap. XV, 3.

10. Mrs. Blair Niles, in *Black Haiti* (New York, 1926), pp. 185–186, tells of a prisoner who preferred to remain in jail rather than be freed. "When he gets out," she quotes the officer as saying, "he'll be in again. You'll see. Here he gets nine cents a day for food, an' that's more than the average Haitian ever has."

11. One can well believe the story (told by Ebenezer D. Bassett, *Haiti* [Washington, 1893], p. 3) of the English admiral who, asked by George III for a description of the island, crumpled a sheet of paper, threw it on the table, and said: "Sire, Haiti looks like that." The same tale is told of Puerto Rico, with a Spanish admiral speaking to Queen Isabella.

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to ally himself with the ruling family. When Dessalines shortly discovered his daughter's condition, he burst into maledictions against all mulattoes, saying that they had plotted this disgrace to him and to his family. He went so far as to speak of having them all executed.

The Emperor's determination, and all his measures, could not quench the social ambition of his leading subjects. They bore what must be borne, conspiring meanwhile to get rid of him. They still had the advantage over the masses of a superior education, and they knew the path to eminence, once the obstacle of the Emperor was removed.

Nothing was done during the reign of Dessalines to cultivate the minds of the laboring class. Discipline backed by force was the guiding principle in dealing with them. Instead of trying to educate his people to understand their duties and to take an active part in statecraft, Dessalines—his generals and counselors, mulatto and black alike, thoroughly approving—used only compulsion. There was actually little difference between the attitude of this ruling clique toward the mass of laborers and that of their former white owners. Both looked upon them as cattle. A few of his advisers tried to persuade the Emperor to provide moral and religious education for the people so that they would not be seduced into completely evil ways, but the Emperor replied, "You are wrong: the laborers can be controlled only by fear of punishment and even death; I shall lead them only by these means; my 'morale' shall be the bayonet."

In short, between 1804 and 1806 no prominent figure in Haitian life seems even to have dreamed of "liberal" institutions. Those who had education, knowledge, and culture preserved them carefully for themselves. The wisdom, even the possibility, of enlightening the masses was doubted. Most Haitians remained in complete ignorance of what went on in the outside world.

Dessalines was killed by ambush near Port-au-Prince on October 17, 1806. The mulattoes were generally supposed to have planned the assassination, for it was well known that they had no cause to be fond of him. His callousness had raised up enemies in all walks of life. The cultivators were glad he was gone, because of his harshness. They were virtually slaves again in all but name; it was reported that upon his personal estates he had made unsatisfactory workers run the gauntlet between lines of soldiers armed with thorny switches, and

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vengeance but the utter extermination of that race."[12] He even ordered the execution of a mulatto woman in Gonaïves because she had prayed for the success of Pétion.

During the latter years of his reign his personal popularity waned somewhat, owing to his relentless insistence upon efficiency and to his increasing tendency to lose his temper. Defections to the South occurred almost daily. The cultivators, comparing their never-ceasing toil on Northern plantations with the reported liberty and leisure of life in the South, continually drifted away. So alluring was the paradise of ease (and poverty) of the neighboring realm that Christophe found it necessary to keep a cordon of soldiers along the borders of his kingdom to prevent desertions. His administration now embarked on actual persecution of colored people. Inflammatory pamphlets were spread abroad, designed to make the Negroes think that the mulattoes were planning to enslave them once again. Under this campaign of propaganda many light-skinned Northerners had to go into hiding.

Despite all discrimination, the important line was drawn between cultivators who formed nine tenths of the population, and aristocrats who, with the army, made up the remainder. The nobility, the directors of landed estates, and the generals directed the activities of other people, so that the colonial prejudice against manual labor was strengthened. Here lay the basis of a persistent Haitian attitude of mind: to work with one's hands is to show oneself a member of the masses; to direct others is the distinction of the upper class. Education, neglected under Dessalines altogether, was fostered by Christophe. He established a few schools, inviting as schoolmasters certain Englishmen familiar with the then popular methods of the Lancasterian system; but since the cultivators were busy on the plantations, only the children of aristocrats benefited by the limited educational system and the social distance between classes was increased.

A French commentator says that Christophe showed unusual insight in devising for his kingdom "the only organization of which an African society was capable," namely, a combination of military despotism with certain benevolent inclinations, and territorial feudalism based upon a nobility created by the King. Actually, it suited not so much the African background of the people, which lay

12. Dr. Jonathan Brown, *The History and Present Condition of St. Domingo* (Philadelphia, 1837), II, 197.

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171 feudal holdings to absolute ownership of land by the influential. It is
175 strangely paradoxical that an aristocrat, the light-skinned Pétion,
631 representing the cultured group in society, broke the economic power of his own aristocratic class and made the former slaves not serfs but peasants. It is doubtful whether he intended either result.

175 Alexandre Pétion was the antithesis of Haiti's three eminent blacks
643 in all but military skill. Toussaint's genius as a fighter lay in his
159 surprise moves, Dessalines' in his recklessness, Christophe's in his bulldog determination; but Pétion was a great general because he knew when to retire and so lead his enemy into an exposed position. The three Negroes had been born in slavery; Pétion, coming of a cultured and sophisticated affranchi family, grew up in France. Dessalines was a crude ruffian by comparison, while in the face of Pétion's suavity Christophe's impetuousness seemed rankly uncouth. Where they bludgeoned, Pétion persuaded; where they hacked their way through opposition in the determination to gain an end, he graciously yielded and so won new friends. Tactful at every point, he survived even such contretemps as his refusal of the hand of the Emperor's daughter.

As leader of a young nation, Pétion might almost be said to have had too broad an understanding of human nature. He was a gentle ruler over his people; when they erred he did not punish or upbraid, but excused their misdeeds by assuming the cause to be some fatal compulsion over which they momentarily had no control. He had no wish to drive the nation to "success." Neither did he care to use his position for personal aggrandizement. His mind was supple and practical, disdainful of abstractions, undeluded by resounding slogans, fertile in compromise, not finical as to means, always unsurprised, exquisitely tactful. When crises arose to dismay his ministers, Pétion's philosophic calm was undisturbed.

Cynically tolerant, he gave office to political enemies if they chanced to be able. A representative of the topmost class of society,
648 he managed to moderate antagonisms based on color. He gave
● 87 sanctuary and financial succor to the Spanish-American liberator,
423 Simón Bolívar; he established the foundations of an educational system; he defended the state against Christophe's power; he ruled constitutionally; and he gave land to his people, even to the humblest of them. When he died, his subjects for miles around came into Port-au-Prince, where they stood weeping about his palace, refusing

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Next to the agricultural system, the state of education in the republic probably had as much to do as anything with fixing the caste system upon Haiti. So long as the mass of people were not only black but illiterate as well, they would have no means of reaching a social status beyond the one in which they existed. Certainly the aspiring Negroes would not wish to enlighten them, for to stir up the whole people would destroy the very possibility of distinction. As W. S. Gilbert puts it, "When everyone is somebody, then no one's anybody." Public education, consequently, hardly advanced a step during Boyer's twenty-five years. It had had a feeble enough beginning under Pétion and remained, as it had been, a prerogative of the well-to-do.[58]

Under the complaisant rule of Boyer, accordingly, the people of color came to regard themselves as the unquestioned élite. Their claim was shared, though not always acknowledged, by a small number of blacks (mostly from the North) who had been anciens libres in colonial Saint-Domingue or noblemen under Christophe; who were literate, or whose wealth and ambition attracted attention. Boyer's boast that "all the feelings and prejudices, either of olden times or of national origin, have been superseded by an intense patriotism" was pure buncombe, as he certainly knew.

If only the best brains of the colored group had been content to serve the government, Haiti might have profited from her situation; but lesser government offices were merely springboards for foreign trade in coffee and mahogany, or for the manipulation of business deals. Not "intense patriotism," as Boyer liked to think, but financial gain was the motivating force of the élite, as it had been from colonial times. The man who could amass a modest fortune, so that his children might be educated and their security assured, had done his duty, and he would have been regarded as quixotic to renounce business opportunities for the dubious honor of minor political office. As a consequence of this natural search for gain, the government during Boyer's administration became less and less efficient. Relatives of élite businessmen were given posts because the President could not afford to offend important families. These minor officials then performed their duties awkwardly, or neglected them, in "the unfailing obliquity of dullness."

Skin color became the obsession of high society. Those who had no other merit of which to boast could still revel in their complex-

58. See chap. XVI.

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[p. 113]

INTRODUCTION

IF the visitor to Haiti is first struck by the wide separation between the élite and the peasant masses, the person who knows Haiti only through books is sure to think of it as a country of Voodoo. There is no error of fact here, for Voodoo is characteristic of Haiti. Nevertheless, what the American conjures up in his mind when he uses the word is almost certain to be misleading. In spite of detailed reports of anthropologists the average American clings firmly to his notion that Voodoo is Negro superstition chiefly concerned with charms or spells to "hoodoo" (a variation of the same word) an enemy. Scientists rarely succeed in correcting long-held but incorrect or one-sided impressions of the meaning of terms; they end rather by inventing a new word, or else continue the generally losing fight for precise usage, and so preserve the confusion.[1]

Since there is small likelihood of eradicating the inexact connotations of "Voodoo," many recent anthropologists have adopted such spellings as Vodun, Vodou, Vodoun, Vaudou, and Vodûn, all renditions of local pronunciation of the same term. *Vodun* (pronounced Vo-doon) has been chosen for use in this work, in the hope that readers will bear in mind that the folk religion is not mere idle superstition. A grasp of the real and distinctive religious beliefs and cult practices of the Haitian is very necessary to an understanding of the social picture.

Like its caste system, the religious life of Haiti presents far-reaching contrasts. The only approved religion of the country is Roman Catholicism. To this faith all the élite who are religiously inclined, or wish to pay formal homage to the institution of religion, belong. No Protestant sect has ever gained a real foothold in Haiti. Catholic churches are among the imposing edifices in every town; Catholic priests are an everyday sight as they go about their parishes; Catholic brothers and sisters, with state support and approval, direct much of the higher education in the country.

1. Witness in anthropology the contrast between the popular and the scholarly meaning of *culture*, *race*, *taboo*, and *fetish*; in chemistry of *reaction* (as when a man is asked his "reaction" to an opinion); in psychology of *instinct*, *innate*, and *inherent*; and in sociology of *caste*, *institution*, and *social*.

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ideas than in later years, the habits of regular attention to religious duties might have been fixed; by 1860 it was too late. Religion existed during those years, but it was a strange gallimaufry of Catholicism and folk belief.

On the whole, the rulers of young Haiti were tolerant of the Catholic Church even to the point of advancing its interests, in so far as these might benefit the state. Their pronouncements and actions, nevertheless, were not those of ardent personal believers. Pétion's constitution of the republic in 1806 once more established Catholicism as the official Church. What it gave with one hand, however, it took away with the other. Thus:

Art. 35. The Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion being that of all Haitians, is the religion of the state. It and its ministers will be protected.

Art. 36. The law assigns to each minister of that religion the extent of his spiritual administration. These ministers may not, under any pretext, form a body within the state.

Art. 37. If in the course of time other religions are introduced, no person shall be hindered, so long as he conforms to the laws, in following the cult he has chosen.

The Catholic, then, is the state religion, but only because the Haitians have heretofore been nominal Catholics. It occupies a position of practical fact which it would lose if by the introduction of other cults Haitians should be drawn away from it. Its ministers will be carefully watched to see that they do not, as a group, try to exert political pressure. And what freedom of action is possible to a church whose ecclesiastical parishes can be limited or extended in size by the civil legislature?

Pétion no more fought religion than he fought any other conventional institution approved by civilized people; but he did little to foster it. He received certain Wesleyan missionaries with considerable hospitality, remarking that "education increases the dignity of mankind." He appeased the good Catholics by repealing the law concerning the rights of illegitimate children, substituting for it a more moderate French rule.[4] Likewise, he invited the Catholic Church to participate in the education of Haitian youth.

4. The French practice allowed an illegitimate child recognized before a wedding equal rights of inheritance with legitimate offspring, while giving only quarter rights to a child recognized after marriage.

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Christophe had a great deal more to say about religion than any of the other early Haitian rulers. In a speech following the promulgation of his constitution, after severe censure of the government of Dessalines, he said:

> It is necessary to raise again the dignity of religion, for weakened morals leave young people open to the licenses of their age. Liberty has been assailed by traitors, enemies of their fellow citizens, and sold to our cruelest enemies. It is assured to you now, have no doubt! Shortly you will see these vicious men and their criminal efforts vanish like clouds.
>
> Public education, after religion and liberty the most precious benefit mankind enjoys, will be reanimated and sustained by morality; it will again be held in honor and reverence amongst us. Divorce, that traitor among customs, is rigorously prohibited and proscribed forever.[5]

Like Pétion, Christophe made the Catholic Church official, but he indicated the dictatorial path he intended to follow by adding that no ecclesiastical decree or law might become effective without the consent of the President.[6] He completely overturned the law of Dessalines concerning illegitimate children; his decree deprived such offspring of any claims of inheritance whatever.[7] In a country where practically no one had been legally married such a ruling was severe, but Christophe hoped that his severity would force his subjects into wedlock, and this the Catholic Church was bound to approve.

Making the Church official did not strengthen its hold upon the people. In 1814 (seven years after he had promised "to raise again the dignity of religion") the kingdom was served by only three priests, one of whom Christophe had named archbishop. The King was preoccupied with form, and having created a nobility he needed a church to lend dignity to his realm. Consequently in 1811 he reorganized the clergy in his kingdom, establishing an archiepiscopal see and three bishoprics. The reorganization, except for the archbishop, remained a paper plan because the Pope refused to coöperate by giving the schismatic church his approval.

All the early rulers seem to have been rather innocent in their dealings with Rome. They felt, apparently, that as heads of state they had but to express a desire in order to have His Holiness ap-

5. This speech, made on February 18, 1807, is cited in Thomas Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti* (Port-au-Prince, 1848), II, 354–355.
6. See the law of March 18, 1807.
7. Law of March 25, 1807.

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of the parish church to which each party belongs, and no ceremony may be performed by a priest without the presentation of the certificate of the civil marriage.

According to the legal code, as well as actual practice of the upper classes, woman is man's definite inferior in rights.[7] The Haitian code follows closely that of Napoleon, and both conform in general to practice common among substantial people in the Haiti and France of the early nineteenth century. Spouses equally owe to each other fidelity, succor, and assistance; the husband owes protection to his wife, the wife obedience to her husband. Although the wife must live with her husband wherever he chooses, he conversely must receive her when she comes to live with him, and must provide food for her. No wife may purchase, sell, give, or otherwise alienate property without the consent of her husband; moreover, the husband alone has the administration of goods coming in the dowry, so long as the union endures.

The modern movement for women's rights has hardly touched Haiti.[8] Women may not vote, nor may they hold public office. Among the élite, in theory and in practice woman's place is in the home, caring for the household and the children. One might imagine himself in provincial France as he sees the daily life of upper-class Haitian women: the ordering of meals, directing of servants, sewing, shopping, visiting, party going, occasional novel reading, driving in the family car. Different from French practice, however, is the taboo against most manual labor: this is the task of servants only. The élite housewife may cook but not sweep, sew but not launder, bargain with a huckster but not carry home her purchases. A woman of the upper classes would demean herself to enter business. Since the American Occupation, as a matter of fact, a few women have been daring enough to become secretaries and stenographers, but there seems to be nothing like a concerted movement for the "emancipation" of élite women. There are schools for girls, but these do not reach as far as the schools for boys; women are not admitted to the law school or medical school, for a woman lawyer or doctor would be unthinkable in Haitian society.

7. See Louis Borno, *Code civil d'Haïti annoté* (Port-au-Prince, 1892), chap. VI, articles 196–201.

8. See, however, Madeleine G. Sylvain, "The Feminist Movement in Haiti," *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, LXXIII, No. 6 (June, 1939), 313–321.

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Boyer was overthrown by the Revolution of 1843, by all odds the

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most important of Haitian upheavals. Since its effects were to be felt for the next seventy years in the extinction of representative government and the eclipse of the élite as political rulers, it is worthy of special attention. Paradoxically, it was a revolution fomented by the élite themselves. Its background and outcome reveal the power in word, and the impotence in deed, of this group by 1843.

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The constitution of 1816, devised by Pétion's henchmen, had granted the president initiative in all laws except those concerning taxation. After the agreement of 1825 with France,[6] however, Boyer, hard pressed by the need of paying the indemnity each year, began to restrict the number of officials, diminish their salaries, and veto all projects favorable to the development of public instruction and improvement which might cause further expenditure. By temperament he was an autocrat.[7] Every valuable measure must come from him alone; whatever another person proposed he would find a thousand reasons to discard. Sarcastic and vain, he did not know how to smooth ruffled feelings or make conflicting groups reconcile their differences. His personal weaknesses of character alienated the sympathies of many once-devoted officials.

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During his long presidency Boyer also systematically ignored the younger generation, men who admired the efforts of Pétion, ardent reformers who wished to devote their energies to the improvement of Haiti. The military career had no attraction for them: the higher ranks, alone bringing sufficient salary for a congenial way of life, were too few and one could achieve them only with difficulty, for since 1825 advancement had been submitted to rigorous rules. On the other hand, the paths of administration were severely guarded by those admirable great functionaries left over from the government of Pétion—men like Inginac and Imbert. But age had slowed their activity, and still Boyer kept them on. The younger generation mocked this "gerontocracy" and supported the parliamentary opposition.

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The youth of the élite class continued to go to France for their education, returning to Haiti to take part in the lively political discussions which made one of their chief occupations. During the first decade of Boyer's administration they generally supported him, for

6. By which France recognized the independence of Haiti in return for the payment of a large annual indemnity.

7. "In everything, he wishes to dominate," Pétion had said of him.

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175 665 664 871 he seemed to be leading the country to progressive action; about 1830, however, a group better educated and more ambitious than their predecessors arose. Nourished on ideas acquired in France, they were shocked on their return by the miseries and governmental inaction which prevailed in Haiti. True, when Boyer pressed them to suggest constructive measures of reform they had little to suggest. Like many other critics they were better at tearing down than at building up.

175 642 204 208 665 By the constitution of 1816 they had the right of free speech and press, and made use of it to publish journals of criticism—*Le Phare, Le Télégraphe, La Feuille de Commerce*. Their sustained criticism kept alive the parliamentary opposition and gave it a focus; they were at least partially responsible for the Revolution of 1843. In spite of their diatribes, Boyer did not suppress these newspapers. If he had done so it is possible the Revolution might have come sooner. Not every dictator-president would permit such boldness as the following paragraph which appeared in 1843 in *Le Patriote*, an adversary of Boyer's own journal *Le Temps:*

> Let one look well at the things which are happening among us and then say whether, considering our first steps along the path, our progress has not been constantly slowed up now for some time, and whether this does not lead to a state of things in our country in which the most vital part of our civilization is struck by an immobility, almost a paralysis. Haiti is stationary, is retrograde: we need no other proof of it than this frightful uncertainty about the future which so deeply disturbs all serious minds and sincere patriots.

175 665 646 643 664 In 1838 Hérard Dumesle, president of the Chamber and a leader of the opposition, drew up and secured the passage of an "Address to the President of the Republic," which expressed certain just ideas of progress and pointed out that failure to achieve it was due to the mistakes of the administration. It was a bitterly critical and sometimes passionate document. Boyer was intensely angry and proceeded to violate the constitution: relying on the majority always at his disposal in the Chamber, he excluded from among the deputies those most hostile to his government.[8] But at the election of 1842 the communes of Les Cayes, Aquin, and Jérémie reëlected the expelled representatives, so confirming their criticism of the President.

8. Hérard Dumesle, Laudun, Lartigue, and David Saint-Preux.

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Even Geffrard the reformer,

175 643 661 ably the ablest president in the second half-century, who was pledged to reduce the expenses of government (a promise which, since he was accustomed to a life of penury, should have been easy to fulfill), increased his own salary to $50,000 a year, and allowed himself $20,000 more annually for secret service and a similar sum "for the encouragement of arts and sciences." He bought two estates with government money; the meat bill of his family was charged to the budget of his bodyguard, and the family champagne bill to a hospital. After Geffrard, the presidency was openly regarded as the juiciest financial plum in Haiti which, if one could pluck it, would justify the necessary expenditures for a revolution. It seems from contemporary comment, indeed, that Geffrard's actions aroused not censure but rather envy, as if every ambitious Haitian would have welcomed the opportunity to do likewise. The bitingly critical Englishman, Sir Spenser St. John, railed with some justice, "Every Haitian appears fully persuaded that his countrymen never seek office except for the purpose of improving their private fortunes."[15]

175 643 646 The legislature was never a real check upon the President. It was useful to him at times when he wished to delay action on some embarrassing imbroglio with a foreign power, for by referring a measure to the Senate he could stall it in tedious debate. Almost without exception, however, the legislature consisted of the President's men. Its halls were palaces of idle oratory. One whole session was devoted to a discussion of fitting the hall with cushioned seats; another to the propriety of appointing an interpreter for representatives who understood only Créole and not French. To make a man a Senator was a satisfactory way of paying a political debt. To be a Senator was to have social prominence, a salary of $1,600 (decidedly a competence in nineteenth-century Haiti), an opportunity to speak before an audience—and no real responsibility.

179 One may grant without debate the difficulties facing this small and poor country, a Negro state with great white neighbors who regarded it with something less than deference. Yet Haiti in its early days had real promise. Wherein lay its defects? Haitian thinkers knew the answers, and frequently indicted themselves.

175 ● 871 565 658 The want of education was a basic weakness. Those who believe in democracy need no rehearsal of the benefits of popular enlightenment. Because the great Negro heads of state were themselves im-

15. *Hayti, or the Black Republic*, p. 185.

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perfectly educated, and because other matters seemed infinitely more pressing than the setting up of schools, the early Haitians, united in 1804, fell apart within a single generation. On one hand were the élite and a few other townspeople who knew at least something of the outside world; on the other the masses of toiling countryfolk to whom tiny Haitian valleys were the whole universe. The young men of these two classes coming to power could not understand each other; they could not make concessions to each other; and as they fought for what they held true, each grew suspicious of the other if not permanently hostile. The lack of common understanding might still have been repaired in any one generation, but no single president had the vision to inaugurate universal education. Aside from the expense, certain powerful élite citizens often expressed their doubts as to the educability of the peasants; as property owners they would undoubtedly have objected to the unsettling of the economic order, which was based upon the work of an ignorant mass of blacks.[16]

Without education, the political sphere went unenriched by any flow of new blood from the people. Politics existed in a vacuum. The earthy, candid criticisms of a politically conscious folk never invigorated the discussion of national affairs. Without education, the people had no standards of comparison of Haiti with other nations, and were the easy dupes of whatever insurrectionary agitator could persuade them that their daily woes were caused by the current administration. Without education, high political office became a prerogative of the few, a contest between the Ins and the Outs, a path to personal wealth. Without education, Haiti could never be more than a dictatorship by a man or a clique, her stability endangered with the downfall of each incumbent, for dictatorships rarely provide for continuity in government.

Another great weakness was the notion that national happiness could be achieved by political means primarily. After the germinal ideas of Christophe and Pétion, which had a basis in economic behavior, hardly another important concept came out of a century of presidents. Haitian politicians have been great arrangers: they have given the country eighteen constitutions and innumerable codes, all admirable in their loving solicitude for precise detail. The common feeling of political aspirants has been, "If we are given power, all will

16. This argument is clearly stated in Madiou, *op. cit.*, III, 176 ff.

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XV

HAITIAN PROBLEMS

FOR a citizen of the United States or a European country, national problems have to do with external as well as internal affairs. Foreign relations, armaments, international trade, treaties and commitments, loom as large as do unemployment, business depression, labor troubles, and social maladjustment. Political parties rise and fall with their promises or failures to deal successfully with matters arising from the country's position relative to world movements. In Haiti such generalizations do not hold. Her international relations have been and are comparatively minor, while her internal problems have been of a different order from those which trouble most of the rest of the Western World. This is not meant to imply that a world depression leaves Haiti unscathed, or that the country does not suffer when its trade in coffee is interrupted, but rather that its persistent problems would continue to exist whatever the state of world politics and economics.

Contacts of the Haitian people with the outside world between 1804 and 1915 were meagre. The slaughter of whites by Dessalines, the economic decline of the country, unwillingness of white nations to treat with a Negro state, the schism in the Catholic Church, restrictive legislation against white foreigners, general illiteracy of the people—all these shut Haiti off from the world. Christophe, it is true, invited in a few English schoolmasters and agricultural experts, but these remained only a short while and had little influence even among the élite. For a century Haiti saw no foreigners except the few traders at seaports, an occasional Wesleyan missionary, a limited number of consuls and ministers, certain travelers interested in odd corners of the earth, and, after 1860, Catholic priests and sisters. For the peasants there ceased to be any knowledge of the world outside of Haiti; for the élite France once more became the centre of the social universe, as it had been for the affranchis in colonial times. From Boyer's time onward élite youths went to Paris for an education, if they could afford it; the "culture" they acquired there had little relationship to Haitian problems.

Foreign relations, in the political sense, revolved during most of

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not find herself constantly embroiled with European states and American financial interests. The Haitian debt was funded, and a financial adviser remained in the country even after the Occupation came to an end. It is expected that by 1943 the last debt will be paid; the financial adviser, however, withdrew in 1941. Since the Occupation, although the republic has been free to manage her own affairs, she has consulted frequently with the State Department in Washington.

Nineteen years of occupation ended the century of Haitian isolation. The Americans built roads, conducted health campaigns, made their presence felt even in remote hamlets and valleys. American authors, political, romantic, and sensational, discovered the Antillean republic. Steamship companies stopped their cruises for a few hours at Cap-Haïtien to allow tourists to visit the Citadel, and at Port-au-Prince to see the sights of the capital. Every Haitian now realizes that there is a world outside.

Whatever crises have arisen in Haitian affairs, certain problems have persisted. For whom do they constitute a source of worry? Since the government has always been a dictatorship, limited or absolute, subject to no party control, the incumbents of office have never had the experience of being constantly reminded by their opponents of the misery or daily worries of the population. After a hundred years the people have learned that relief is not to be expected from politicians. Occasionally a dramatic revolutionary leader has persuaded some of the people that the officials in power were responsible for their distress, and so worked up a following; yet even when such movements succeeded, the masses never benefited. To most governments of the past century Haiti's problem has been only one: to frustrate insurrection. There is evidence that recent administrations have busied themselves assiduously with the country's internal problems, although none of them has been adequately solved. The élite, at least as a group, do not feel any apparent responsibility for the maladjustments, nor obligation to effect the necessary reforms. A few patriots, and those almost without exception not in office, know what ails the country and say so; a smaller number propose reasonable solutions. The problems remain. Of these the three outstanding are overpopulation with all its accompanying ills, health, and education.

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3. *Education*

871 To a people like the Americans who accept democracy as desirable, and regard universal education as a necessary basis for democracy, it would seem a simple matter for the Haitians to build schools all over the countryside, pass laws requiring attendance, and so within a decade, or at the outside a generation, reform the whole country. To the American, education is the fount from which all democratic blessings flow. For the Haitian the problem is neither so clearly defined nor so simply solved.

565 871 The élite, who are solidly in control of the government, are aristocrats partly (largely, one might even say) because they are educated. Because of the maxim of Haitian life since the beginning that a literate man should not do manual labor, any program which proposed universal education would cut the ground from under the present social structure by giving the masses equal opportunities with the élite, and at the same time ruin the economic organization by making peasants want to desert field labor for professions and business. An ordinary degree of self-interest is quite sufficient to explain the lack of enthusiasm of the ruling class when the subject of general education is broached.

871 Good reasons are often given by people in lieu of real reasons for their actions. One of the good reasons advanced by Haitian ministries for the failure of the government to promote universal education is its cost. Those American states whose population is prevailingly rural know the validity of this reasoning. With children [369] scattered over the rural regions—and nine out of ten Haitians do not live in towns or large villages—it would require thousands of new school buildings to reach the prospective students. Salaries of teachers, purchase of supplies, and general upkeep would have to be added annually to the national budget in addition to the initial outlay for the erection of school buildings. Here one comes up immediately against the unyielding fact of the puny national income. Its $7,000,000 could under no circumstances be stretched to cover an architectural program commensurate with Haiti's educational needs.

871 178 Another good reason for the failure of democratic education is the demonstrated apathy of the masses. In the zeal for improvement during the early days of the Occupation, rural schools were estab-

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lished in many parts of the country. Attendance was fair for a few days, then rapidly declined. It is obviously a task requiring patience, persistence, originality, and tact on the part of the teacher to keep the students interested enough in school to make them attend regularly, for certainly the parents, who themselves have had no education, will not force their children to attend. On the contrary, the average peasant parent feels it much more important for his children to be at work in the fields, doing something useful, than to waste time learning to read and write—accomplishments which peasants have done without from time immemorial. Forced attendance is clearly out of the question. Obviously, too, at the small wages paid to country teachers the necessary qualities of personality are uncommon, to say the least. Five thousand men and women with the consecration of missionaries would be required even to begin the work of general education.

A practically insoluble problem, given current attitudes, is that of the language to be used in rural schools, assuming that these are built. The only official language of Haiti is French; the only language understood by the masses is Créole, which in spite of its French origin is as different from that tongue as Dutch from German. Now every Haitian, high and low, knows Créole, so that the question immediately arising is: Why should not the rural teachers teach in Créole? The answer involves every sort of inward prejudice, yearning, and instilled doctrine. The teacher is almost sure to be struggling up to the élite class, and to require him to deny himself the luxury of speaking French (to him almost a patent of nobility) would be heart-rending. Likewise, he would have his "good" reason for teaching school in French: the unity of the country demands a single language; all schoolbooks are in French, none in Créole; and Créole has no literature, nor even an accepted spelling. The fact remains that except in rare instances all schoolteachers use French to their pupils, and not one peasant out of a hundred can even guess what is being said in that language.

Assuming that schools were available, as well as trained teachers willing to speak the folk language, the next problem would be the curriculum. The whole tradition of élite education is literary, not practical. Teachers trained in this tradition might teach Racine and Montaigne, but not soil conservation and new methods of planting. Peasants with a knowledge of French literature would, of course, be

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no longer peasants. What good would a literary education do them? Yet those who have advocated a technical or practical curriculum have been met with a perfect storm of opposition. Such training would, it has been argued, merely augment and perpetuate the social stratification of the country; moreover, since no Haitian élite have been technically trained nor had any desire to be, the teaching of the whole rural mass would have to be in the hands of aliens—white Americans, more than likely. Once again, it is a matter of current attitudes: the rural teacher keen to rise out of the masses into the upper class would, if the curriculum were technical, be required to abandon the gratifying display of his literary knowledge, and devote his talents instead to the manual skills from which he had been trying to escape.

It is hardly necessary to mention the insuperable problem of training the teachers and persuading them to dedicate their lives to rural education: to live away from the amenities of urban life, at a minute salary, among an ignorant peasantry. Only the devotion of rare patriots would prompt such complete self-sacrifice, even if the government had a tithe of the funds necessary for educating teachers for their jobs and paying them a living wage.

A glance at Haitian history will also help to explain the sorry state of education. In 1804, of course, there was not a single school in the country, and Dessalines was too much preoccupied with other affairs to give the matter a thought; besides, being illiterate himself, he may well have thought learning unimportant, or at least, embarrassing. Both Christophe and Pétion showed an exemplary zeal for education, although the results accomplished by them seem small enough. They were both impressed by the Lancasterian method then in vogue in England, and modeled the few schools they sponsored upon it. Christophe, always an Anglophile, established five "*grandes écoles nationales*" at Cap-Henry, Port-de-Paix, Sans Souci, Gonaïves, and Saint-Marc, with English masters at the head of each.[12] Pétion established at Port-au-Prince a Lycée Haïtien in 1816, and assigned an "instructeur" in every parish. The curriculum of the Lycée—ancient and modern languages, rhetoric, logic, ethics, elements of mathematics, ancient and modern history, geography, and drawing—is an indication of the limited scope of the program. It was purely

12. Placide Justin, *Histoire politique et statistique de l'Île d'Haïti, Saint-Domingue*, pp. 314–315.

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for the élite, and was purely cultural. By 1828 there were lower schools in six towns of the country, but only one higher school in the whole of Haiti.[13]

A report on the condition of education in 1842 showed that the Lycée still existed, its curriculum now limited to French, English, Spanish, Latin, mathematics, composition, history, and fencing.[14] Only 150 students were enrolled. By 1843 there were eleven secondary schools. The question was even raised whether Boyer's failure to promote education during the twenty-five tranquil years of his rule might not have been deliberate, on the principle that it is easier to govern ignorance than knowledge.[15] Actually, however, there was little pressure for education, and so Boyer did nothing.

Geffrard more than any other president of the nineteenth century encouraged education, with the result that almost 20,000 children received some kind of schooling. The census of 1875 made the following estimates:[16]

4 lyceums	with	543 pupils
6 girls' high schools		563
5 girls' secondary schools		350
165 primary schools		11,784
200 rural schools		5,939
1 medical school		25
1 school of music		46
Total		19,250 pupils

To these must be added a few pupils in private schools and in the recently established Catholic schools of the Frères de l'Instruction Chrétienne and the Sisters of Cluny.

Toward the turn of the century, when reformers were writing books while the whole country seemed to be slowly dying under its stupid presidents, many a proposal was made which hit squarely upon the need of education and the necessity of a specifically practical curriculum. Joseph Justin[17] urged technical training by experts, and many others hammered away at the same idea. A small sum

13. Charles Mackenzie, *Notes on Hayti*, I, 83, 120–122, 138.
14. John Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti*, pp. 74 ff.
15. Mark B. Bird, *The Black Man* (New York, 1869), p. 140.
16. Cited by Sir Spenser St. John, *Hayti, or The Black Republic*, p. 293.
17. *Etude sur les institutions haïtiennes* (Paris, 1894–95), 2 vols.

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was put into the national budget to be used for schools, but it seems generally to have been used as a fund for presidential patronage. There were even "school teachers" who could not read, but were nevertheless paid a regular monthly stipend. The principal of the Lycée at Gonaïves could neither read nor write, the music teacher there knew not a note of music, and the medical director could not name the simplest drugs.[18] Dantès Bellegarde, one of Haiti's notable intellectuals, as a minister under Nord Alexis (1902–8) made definite proposals which, had they been carried out, would have gone far toward effecting a radical reform. Minister again under Oreste (1913–14), he succeeded in building up an educational fund, but before he could spend it properly Oreste was deposed and the money used by his successor, Zamor, for military purposes.[19]

By 1915, before the Occupation began, the country had about 730 public schools. Of these, 6 gave advanced courses in medicine, law, applied science, and commerce; 10 offered a secondary classical education; 8 were special secondary boys' schools; and 15 were special secondary girls' schools. The teachers all got their training in Haiti, and the curricula and methods were almost entirely French.[20] Bellegarde had divided the country into 14 school districts, and by 1919 the official figures showed the following enrollment:[21]

387 elementary rural schools	with	21,960 pupils
206 elementary urban schools		13,881
105 presbyterial schools		4,836
49 mixed private schools		825
29 Catholic girls' schools		5,141
8 Catholic boys' schools		2,576
10 mixed popular schools		1,009
2 girls' professional schools		133
1 manual training school		555
60 national high schools		2,012
Private elementary schools		5,481
Private high schools		2,904
Total		61,313 pupils

18. See Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
19. Dantès Bellegarde, *Pour une Haïti heureuse* (Port-au-Prince, 1929), pp. 100 ff.
20. Dantès Bellegarde, *Un Haïtien parle*, p. 31.
21. *Livre bleu d'Haïti, 1919–20* (Port-au-Prince, 1920), pp. 21–22.

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These figures seem moderately impressive by comparison with those of 1875; but a government report of 1931 states[22] that of the 361 rural schools visited by investigators, 89 had no seats for their pupils, and 157 had only from one to three benches; 122 had neither desks nor tables upon which the pupils might work; 341 had no maps. Of the total number of 977 benches found in all the rural schools, 303 were almost unusable, and of the 26 maps in existence, 13 were entirely beyond use. Of the 355 teachers examined, 257 could not read, and 278 could not add, subtract, multiply, or divide. The average monthly salary was 32.07 gourdes, or $6.21. Of the 17,679 pupils enrolled in rural schools, only 4,022 attended. In this same report President Vincent claims to have made a radical reform in all these matters. His rural teachers are trained, many of them at the government agricultural school at Damien; school equipment has been distributed; salaries have been raised to 65 gourdes, or $13.

The American Occupation showed itself keen to assist education, but unintentionally the measures taken by the whites ran afoul of politics to a serious degree. The excellent agricultural experiment school at Damien was filled with élite students who attended it, in the opinion of many, chiefly in order to receive the scholarships offered; moreover, the class question was raised and bitterly argued: Should peasant students live and study with the élite, and should the curriculum be the same for both? Finally, education was one of the few matters not specifically included in the treaty between Haiti and the United States as under American direction. The result was unhappy: the Occupation was accused of setting up a rival educational "system" to that of the government. Even Bellegarde, most of whose ideas the Americans were trying to carry out, found himself in opposition, chiefly as a result of methods and political implications involved.

If only the budget of the country could be increased, one feels that the rural educational problem might be dealt with, for more and more people are aware of what education might do for the country. Even so, there are still many élite who betray their fear that with education the masses will desert the land and cease to be subservient.

That the élite, who in fact control the country, should receive a training which would fit them for technical skills is a proposal often

22. "*L'Oeuvre d'éducation rurale du gouvernement du Président Vincent*" (Imprimerie de l'Etat, Port-au-Prince, 1934).

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heard among the more thoughtful.[23] The whole country is teeming with opportunities for engineers, doctors, foresters, agronomists, for scientists and specialists of all kinds. Instead of training themselves for such careers the average young men still hanker after the purely honorific career of law, which may lead to governmental posts. A cultured Haitian in 1920 told Dr. Carl Kelsey: "Those of us who have been trained have never been trained to work physically; we do not believe in it; we have no respect for it. We have got to go into the government service; that is the only outlet for any large number of us."[24] And so the average élite boy goes on with his classical training which fits him for nothing but cultured leisure.[25]

23. See especially J. Price-Mars, *La Vocation de l'élite* (Port-au-Prince, 1919), pp. 51 ff.

24. Quoted in Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

25. In the examinations there is often bribery and other dishonesty, according to credible informants. Some of the élite youths seem to feel that because their fathers hold governmental posts they themselves should be passed, no matter what their showing; and not all teachers have fortitude enough to resist the pressure of important parents, for they fear reprisals in the form of dismissal.